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The Modern English Doctrine of Unconscionability  
 
Nelson Enonchong* 
 
Abstract 
This paper argues that the uncertainty that once plagued the English doctrine of 
unconscionability has given way to certainty and predictability, as the criteria for relief 
formulated in Alec Lobb Garages Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd has prevailed over the 
competing criteria identified in Fry v Lane as restated in Cresswell v Potter. It further argues 
that the Alec Lobb test has had the effect of restricting the protective reach of the modern 
English doctrine of unconscionability to such an extent that it is unable to provide effective 
protection to weaker parties. Whilst weaker parties now enjoy significant protection under 
various statutory regimes, it is argued that unconscionability still serves an important 
function and it should be developed to enable it to discharge that office more effectively. The 
paper suggests possible directions in the future development of the English doctrine. In doing 
so, it argues that, unlike the approach emerging in some jurisdictions, English law should 
retain unfairness in the terms of the transaction as a requirement for relief. 
 
 
Introduction 
The jurisdiction of equity to provide relief against unconscionable bargains ‘is long 
established and well known.’1 Yet complaints persist about uncertainty in relation to the 
criteria for relief on this ground.2 Thus unconscionable bargains or unconscionability has 
been described as ‘an extremely uncertain doctrine.’ 3  In England, the uncertainty is 
attributable to inconsistency in the judicial statements of the unconscionability criteria, 
                                                          
* Barber Professor of Law, University of Birmingham, FCIArb, Barrister. I am grateful to the anonymous referee 
for comments and to Sarah Hewitt for research assistance. 
 
1 Pitt v Holt [2011] 2 All ER 450; [2011] EWCA Civ 197 at [165].  
2 Eg in Canada unconscionability has been described as ‘elusive, questionable, uncertain, and potentially 
meaningless’: see GHL Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada,Carswell, Toronto, 2011, p 330; in the USA, E 
Brown, ‘The Uncertainty of U.C.C. Section 2-302: Why Unconscionability has become a Relic’ (2000) 105 
Commercial Law Journal 287 and CL Knapp, ‘Unconscionability in American Contract Law: A Twenty-First 
Century Survey’ in LA DiMatteo et al, eds, Commercial Contract Law: Transatlantic Perspectives, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2013, 309, pp 322-4. 
3 Law Com No 332 Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive Practices (2012), para 3.66. 
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culminating in two main divergent tests: the Cresswell v Potter4 criteria based on Fry v 
Lane,5 and the criteria in Alec Lobb Garages Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd.6 There was 
confusion as some judges adopted the former,7 while others followed the latter.8 Among 
commentators, there is also a division of opinion. Some adopt the three Alec Lobb criteria9 
while others state that four elements are required for relief on this ground10 and that the four 
elements are, in effect, a combination of the Cresswell and Alec Lobb requirements. Another 
view is that there are four elements to the doctrine, but only two are prerequisites for relief. 11  
This paper argues, in Part II, that although for some time there was confusion as to the 
criteria for relief under English law, there is now a consensus in the modern English 
authorities in favour of the Alec Lobb criteria and that this consensus has resulted in certainty 
and predictability. It further advances the view, in Part III, that whilst the Alec Lobb 
consensus has introduced a much welcome certainty into this corner of the law, it has 
significantly restricted the protective reach of unconscionability, thereby leaving a deficit in 
the protection of weaker contracting parties. Although this protection deficit has to some 
extent been covered by statutory regulation of unfairness in contracts, it is argued in Part IV 
that unconscionability still serves an important role in the protection of persons contracting 
under circumstances of special disadvantage and that its scope should be extended to enable it 
to discharge this function effectively. Part V offers some suggestions on possible directions in 
the future development of the English doctrine of unconscionability. In doing so, it argues, 
                                                          
4 [1978] 1 WLR 255 (hereafter Cresswell). 
5 (1889) 40 Ch D 312. 
6 [1983] 1 WLR 87 (hereafter Alec Lobb). 
7 Eg Backhouse v Backhouse [1978] 1 WLR 243 at 250-1; Butlin-Sanders v Butlin [1985] Fam Law 126; Bahbra v 
United Bank [1991] NPC 79. 
8 See the cases mentioned below, n 27-31.  
9 Eg J Beatson, A Burrows and J Cartwright, Anson’s Law of Contract, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016, 
p 401; D Capper, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’ (1998) 114 LQR 479 at 481. 
10 N Bamford, ‘Unconscionability as a Vitiating Factor’ [1995] LMCLQ 538 at 559; N Andrews, Contract Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, p 312; Chen-Wishart, Contract Law, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 2015, p 363.  
11 G Spark, Vitiation of Contracts: International Contractual Principles and English Law, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2013, pp 279-80. 
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inter alia, that unconscionability should continue to be concerned with both procedural and 
substantive unfairness and that, contrary to the view emerging in some jurisdictions, 
unfairness in the terms of the transaction should not be discarded as a criterion for relief. The 
conclusions are stated in Part VI. 
 
The Consensus on the Alec Lobb Criteria  
The jurisdiction to set aside a contract on the ground of unconscionability is not an unfettered 
or unlimited one. The court will intervene only where specific criteria or ‘hallmarks of 
unconscionability’ 12  are satisfied. However, for many years there have been doubt and 
uncertainty as to the applicable criteria. One writer has observed that ‘[t]here is no seminal 
judicial pronouncement in England of the unconscionable bargain criteria’.13 There is indeed 
no authoritative guidance from the UK Supreme Court on this issue. However, in the lower 
courts there have been numerous, albeit inconsistent, judicial pronouncements on the point. 
From the thicket of judicial statements, two different tests gained prominence. On the one 
hand, there is the statement of three criteria identified in Cresswell and, on the other hand, 
there is the different list of three criteria formulated in Alec Lobb. As a result, there was 
uncertainty and confusion on this issue. However, it is submitted that English law is no 
longer plagued by uncertainty on this point, as there is now a judicial consensus on the Alec 
Lobb test, which has allowed the Cresswell test gradually to wither away. It may be helpful 
first to identify the key differences between the two tests. 
 
Differences between the Cresswell and Alec Lobb Tests 
                                                          
12 Portman Building Society v Dusangh [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221 at 229. 
13 D Capper, ‘The Unconscionable Bargain in the Common Law World’ (2010) LQR 403 at 417. 
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In both Cresswell and Alec Lobb three elements were listed as the requirements for relief on 
the ground of unconscionability. However, the elements in the two cases are not identical. In 
Cresswell, the three criteria identified by Megarry J are that: 
(i) the complainant was ‘poor and ignorant’;  
(ii) the transaction was at ‘a considerable undervalue’; and  
(iii) the complainant did not receive independent advice. 14  
Whereas the three criteria articulated in Alec Lobb are that: 
(a) the complainant was ‘at a serious disadvantage to the other, whether through poverty, 
or ignorance, or lack of advice, or otherwise, so that the circumstances existed of 
which unfair advantage could be taken’; 
(b) this weakness of the complainant was ‘exploited by the other [party] in some morally 
culpable manner’; and  
(c) ‘the resulting transaction must have been, not merely hard or improvident, but 
overreaching and oppressive.’15  
To be sure, there are some similarities between the two tests. For example, the first 
Cresswell criterion and the first Alec Lobb requirement are both concerned with inequality 
between the parties in that one party is in circumstances of which unfair advantage could be 
taken and the second Cresswell requirement is similar to the third Alec Lobb requirement in 
that both are concerned with imbalance in the terms of the transaction to the disadvantage of 
the weaker party.  
However, there are important differences between the two tests. First, the Cresswell 
requirement of ‘poor and ignorant’ person is narrower than its Alec Lobb counterpart of a 
person at a ‘serious disadvantage’. Even though in Creswell the court modernised and 
expanded the concept of a ‘poor’ and ‘ignorant’ person so that the former is not limited to 
                                                          
14 [1978] 1 WLR 255 at 257. 
15 [1983] 1 WLR 87 at 94-5. 
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one who is destitute, but refers to ‘a person of the lower income group’ and the latter means a 
‘less highly educated’ person,16 the Alec Lobb formulation is much wider. It includes all those 
who fall within the Cresswell category, but in addition extends to anyone who is at a serious 
disadvantage through lack of advice ‘or otherwise’.  
Secondly, the third requirement in Cresswell (lack of independent advice) is not included 
in the Alec Lobb criteria.  
Thirdly, the Alec Lobb threshold for transactional imbalance (‘not merely hard or 
improvident, but overreaching and oppressive’) is significantly higher than the Cresswell 
threshold (‘considerable undervalue’), as discussed below.17  
Fourthly, and this is the most important difference between the two tests, the Alec Lobb 
criteria includes the requirement that the stronger party must have exploited the weakness of 
the other party in a morally culpable manner. In Cresswell itself, the transaction was set aside 
because the three Cresswell requirements were satisfied, even though there was no specific 
finding that the stronger party acted in a morally culpable manner. However, in Alec Lobb 
relief was refused specifically because there was no finding that the stronger party exploited 
the position of the weaker party in a morally culpable manner. 
 
The Triumph of Alec Lobb 
Whilst for several years the Cresswell and Alec Lobb tests vied with each other for 
supremacy and this resulted in inconsistency and uncertainty, in this century the Alec Lobb 
test has become generally accepted by the courts whilst the Cresswell test has gradually faded 
away. Thus, the Court of Appeal has stated that lack of independent advice, the Cresswell 
criterion that has no counterpart in the Alec Lobb test, is not a requirement for relief,18 
                                                          
16 [1978] 1 WLR 255 at 257. 
17 See section entitled ‘Transactional imbalance: must it be overreaching and oppressive?’ 
18 Eg Alec Lobb [1985] 1 WLR 173 at 182; Portman Building Society v Dusangh [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221 at 
234. 
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although it may be relevant in determining whether the weaker party was under a special 
disability or whether the conduct of the stronger party was unconscionable.19  
By contrast, each of the Alec Lobb criteria has been adopted in the modern authorities. 
Take the criterion that has no counterpart in the Cresswell criteria, namely the requirement 
that the stronger party exploited the special disability of the weaker party in a morally 
culpable manner (unconscionable conduct of the stronger party). Some commentators have 
opined that this is not a requirement for relief, in that ‘the conduct of the [stronger party] is 
largely irrelevant.’ 20  Another writer has stated that, although ‘not clearly resolved’, this 
element ‘is probably also a requirement’.21 However, it is suggested that it is now settled that 
this element is a requirement. First, this element has been a requirement for relief since at 
least the eighteenth century.22 It is such conduct that Lord Hardwicke described in Earl of 
Chesterfield v Janssen23 as constructive fraud. And it is the same kind of fraud, which, a 
century later, Lord Selborne L. C. explained in Earl of Aylesford v Morris 24  as an 
unconscientious use of the power arising out of the relative position of the parties. By the 
close of the 19th century, the House of Lords had confirmed this requirement and refused 
relief in cases where it was not satisfied.25  
Secondly, more recently, this requirement was applied by the Court of Appeal in the Alec 
Lobb case itself26 and in subsequent decisions.27 It has also been applied in the vast majority 
of English decisions in the last 20 years.28  
                                                          
19 N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2012, paras 
19-004 to 19-006. 
20 J Devenney and A Chandler, “Unconscionability and the taxonomy of undue influence” [2007] JBL 541 at 
551. 
21 A Burrows, The Law of Restitution, Oxford University Press, New York, 2011, p 300.  
22 Eg Proof v Hines (1735) Cases T Talbot 111 at 115 25 ER 690 at 691-2; Heathcote v Paignon (1787) 2 Bros CC 
167; 29 ER 96. 
23 (1751) 2 Ves Sen 125 at 155; 28 ER 82 at 100. 
24 (1873) LR 8 Ch App 484 at 491. 
25 Eg O’Rorke v Bolingbroke (1877) 2 App Cas 814; Harrison v Guest (1860) 8 HLC 481, esp 491; 11 ER 517 esp 
521. 
26 [1985] 1 WLR 173 at 182-3, 188-9.  
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Concerning the element of the relative position or circumstances of the parties, it is the 
Alec Lobb formulation of serious disability that has been widely accepted in the modern 
English cases. 29  The courts have not limited themselves to the narrower Cresswell 
requirement of ‘poor’ and ‘ignorant’ person. 
And in relation to the element of transactional imbalance, the courts now prefer the more 
stringent Alec Lobb test that the transaction must have been, ‘not merely hard or improvident, 
but overreaching and oppressive’ 30  to the Cresswell formulation of ‘considerable 
undervalue’.  
On the whole, although the UK Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to issue 
authoritative guidance on the unconscionability criteria, on the current state of the authorities, 
the Alec Lobb criteria have prevailed 31  and the Cresswell criteria have effectively been 
consigned to the ossuary. The result is that the uncertainty and confusion of the past has been 
replaced by certainty and predictability as to the applicable criteria.  
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that other tests of unconscionability have 
been suggested at various times. However, these have not taken root in English law. For 
example, in Strydom v Vendside Ltd,32  the learned judge expressed the view that the three 
requirements for relief are the Alec Lobb elements, but he added that after these requirements 
have been established the burden shifts to the stronger party to show that the transaction was 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
27 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All ER 144 at 152-153; Portman Building Society v 
Dusangh [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221 at 229, 234; Jones v Morgan [2001] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 323 at [35]; [2001] 
EWCA Civ 995 at [35].  
28 Eg Deakin v Faulding [2001] All ER (D) 463 at [86]; Singla v Bashir [2002] EWHC 883 (Ch) at [28]; Humphreys v 
Humphreys [2004] EWHC 2201 (Ch) at [106]; Ruddick v Ormston [2005] EWHC 2547 (Ch) at [32]; Fineland 
Investment Ltd v Pritchard [2011] 6 EG 102 (CS); [2011] EWHC 113 (Ch) at [77]; Liddle v Cree [2011] EWHC 3294 
(Ch) at [92]; Evans v Lloyd [2013] EWHC 1725 (Ch) at [76]; Godden v Godden [2015] EWHC 2633 (Ch) at [92]-
[95]. 
29 Eg Greenwood Forest Products (UK) Ltd v Roberts ([2010] Bus L R D146 at [278]; Jones v Morgan [2001] 
Lloyd’s Rep Bank 323; [2001] EWCA Civ 995 at [39]. 
30 Eg Jones v Morgan [2001] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 323; [2001] EWCA Civ 995 at [39]; Strydom v. Vendside Ltd [2009] 
6 Costs LR 886; [2009] EWHC 2130 (QB) at [39]; Greenwood Forest Products (UK) Ltd v Roberts ([2010] Bus L R 
D146 at [279]; Godden v Godden [2015] EWHC 2633 (Ch) at [94]; 
31 See eg Evans v Lloyd [2013] EWHC 1725 (Ch) at [47]; Greenwood Forest Products (UK) Ltd v Roberts ([2010] 
Bus L R D146 at [269]-[272]; Chagos Islanders v Attorney General [2003] EWHC 2222 (QB) at [558]. 
32 Strydom v Vendside Ltd [2009] 6 Costs LR 886; [2009] EWHC 2130 (QB) at [36].  
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fair, just and reasonable. A similar approach is adopted in Chitty on Contracts.33 Under this 
approach, even after a claimant has established all the three Alec Lobb requirements he may 
nevertheless be refused relief if the stronger party can somehow show that the transaction was 
fair, just and reasonable. This view is, with respect, difficult to support. First, it is not well 
founded in authority. In Strydom v Vendside, no case was cited in support of the proposition. 
The court referred to a passage in Snell's Equity34 which relied on the well-known statement 
of Lord Selborne L.C. in Earl of Aylesford v Morris, 35  quoted below. However, Lord 
Selborne’s statement is concerned with cases where the unconscionable conduct of the 
stronger party (the second Alec Lobb criterion) has not been established by evidence, but 
rather has been presumed. It is in such a case that the burden of proof shifts to the stronger 
party to rebut the presumption, by showing that the transaction was fair, just and reasonable. 
Lord Selborne was talking specifically of those cases in which a presumption of constructive 
fraud is raised.36 He explained that: 
‘Fraud does not here mean deceit or circumvention; it means an unconscientious use of the 
power arising out of these circumstances and the conditions; and when the relative 
position of the parties is such as prima facie to raise this presumption, the transaction 
cannot stand unless the person claiming the benefit of it is able to repel the presumption by 
contrary evidence, proving it have been in point of fact fair, just and reasonable.’37 
This statement does not afford support for the view that after all the three Alec Lobb 
criteria have been established by evidence, the burden of proof shifts to the stronger party to 
show that the transaction was fair, just and reasonable.  
Secondly, quite apart from authority, the Strydom view is questionable in principle. Where 
the court is satisfied on the evidence that the three Alec Lobb requirements are satisfied, it is 
                                                          
33 H Beale, ed, Chitty on Contracts (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2015), vol 1, paras 8-133 and 8-139. 
34 J McGhee, ed, Snell’s Equity, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2005, para 8-47. The passage does not appear in the 
current 33rd edition, para 8-042. 
35 (1873) 8 Ch App 484 at 490. 
36 At 490. 
37 At 490-91. 
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hard to see how it can be possible for the stronger party to show, on the same facts, that the 
transaction was fair, just and reasonable. Moreover, since the unconscionable conduct of the 
stronger party is one of the Alec Lobb criteria which, under the Strydom approach, is to be 
established before the evidential presumption, which shifts the burden of proof, is raised and 
since it is a presumption of wrongdoing 38  or unconscionable conduct, it is completely 
pointless to raise a presumption which presumes that which has already been established by 
evidence.  
Another test of unconscionability that has been advanced is one that has four elements. 
These are, in essence, the three Cresswell criteria plus the Alec Lobb criterion of 
unconscionable conduct of the stronger party. This seems to be the approach of the Privy 
Council in Hart v O’Connor.39 It is similar to the approach adopted more recently by courts 
in some Canadian provinces.40 However, that approach has not been followed by the courts in 
England, where the Alec Lobb approach has taken root. But the Alec Lobb test is not without 
concerns. 
 
The Problem with the Alec Lobb Test 
Whilst the consensus on Alec Lobb has brought the benefit of certainty, it has come with a 
problem of its own, in that it has raised the threshold for relief to such a high level that it is 
now virtually impossible for weaker parties to secure protection on the ground of 
unconscionability. As a result, claims based on unconscionability have failed in the vast 
majority of cases in recent times.41 In effect, the Alec Lobb approach has turned the English 
                                                          
38 Portman Building Society v Dusangh [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221. 
39 [1985] AC 1000. 
40 In Alberta (Cain v Clarica Life Insurance Co, (2005) 263 DLR (4th) 368; 2005 ABCA 437; Benfield Corporate Risk 
Canada Ltd v Beaufort International Insurance Inc [2014] 1 WWR 772 at [125]; 2013 ABCA 200, at [125] and in 
Ontario (Titus v William F Cooke Enterprises Inc (2007) 284 DLR (4th) 734 at [38]-[39]; 2007 ONCA 573 (CanLII) 
at [38]-[39]). 
41 Eg Godden v Godden [2015] EWHC 2633 (Ch); Minder Music Ltd v Sharples [2016] FSR 2; [2015] EWHC 1454 
(IPEC); Evans v Lloyd [2013] 2 P & CR DG21; [2013] EWHC 1725 (Ch); Sandher v Pearson [2013] EWCA Civ 1822; 
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doctrine of unconscionability into something of a toothless bulldog. It has been suggested that 
the current English doctrine of unconscionability ‘is too uncertain to deliver effective 
consumer protection.’42 However, it is submitted that the inability of the modern English 
doctrine to provide effective protection is due more to the restrictive nature of the Alec Lobb 
criteria than to uncertainty. To appreciate the extent to which Alec Lobb has debilitated 
unconscionability under English law it is helpful to examine each of the three Alec Lobb 
criteria or gateways to relief. A comparison with the older cases of the 18th and 19th centuries 
will show that while the threshold for the first Alec Lobb criterion is similar to that in the 
older cases, the thresholds for the remaining two have been raised significantly, making it 
extremely difficult for claimants to satisfy the requirements for relief.  
 
Special disability 
Alec Lobb takes a balanced approach to the requirement of serious or special disability. On 
the one hand, it is not confined to the poor or ignorant person of Cresswell. It covers any 
serious disability that creates circumstances of which unfair advantage could be taken. This is 
in line with the older cases, which recognised a wide range of circumstances capable of 
constituting special disability, including very old age, illness, intoxication, weakness of mind, 
and necessity. 43  The modern cases have also recognised that special disability covers a 
variety of circumstances including old age and senile dementia,44 being under pressure due to 
the imminent collapse of a person’s business to which he was emotionally attached45 and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Fineland Investment Ltd v Pritchard [2011] EWHC 113 (Ch); Liddle v Cree [2011] EWHC 3294 (Ch); Strydom v 
Vendside Ltd [2009] 6 Costs LR 886; [2009] EWHC 2130 (QB); Hughes v Hughes [2005] 1 FCR 679; [2005] 
EWHC 469 (Ch); Ruddick v Ormston [2005] EWHC 2547 (Ch); Humphreys v Humphreys [2004] EWHC 2201 (Ch); 
McCreanney v McCreanney [2003] All ER (D) 161; Singlar v Bashir [2002] EWHC 883 (Ch); Jones v Morgan 
[2001] EWCA Civ 995; Portman Building Society v Dusangh [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221. 
42 Law Com No 332, para 3.51. 
43 See Enonchong, above, n 19, pp 413-433. 
44 Ayres v Hazelgrove, Queens Bench, Russell J, 9 February 1984. 
45 Eg Greenwood Forest Products (UK) Ltd v Roberts, QB, 12 March 2010 at [238]-[239] and [278]. 
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generally lack of assistance where assistance and advice was required.46 On the other hand, 
this gateway to relief is not without restrictions. First, in commercial transactions between 
large entities the court is unlikely to accept that one party was at a serious disadvantage.47 
Secondly, even in a transaction with a person who was poor, illiterate or ignorant, if the 
person received independent advice before entering into the transaction, the courts may not 
accept that the person was under a special disability.48  
 
Unconscionable Conduct of the Stronger Party: when Undue Influence is not Unconscionable 
Conduct 
This requirement is satisfied where the conduct amounts to constructive fraud.49 However, 
constructive fraud covers a wide variety of conduct regarded by equity as morally culpable, 
but not necessarily involving actual dishonesty.50 In the older cases, the threshold was so low 
that the requirement was satisfied where the transaction was concluded in haste in 
circumstances where the weaker party did not receive independent advice,51  even if the 
stronger party advised the weaker party to seek independent advice but he declined.52 The 
requirement was also satisfied even in cases where there was no personal misconduct on the 
part of the stronger party, but there was imprudence or incompetence on the part of the 
solicitor employed to act for both parties.53  In short, the absence of active steps by the 
stronger party to exploit the special disability of the weaker party did not make the conduct of 
the stronger party morally blameless. 
                                                          
46 Ruddick v Ormston [2005] EWHC 2547 (Ch).  
47 Eg Libyan Investment Authority v Goldman Sachs International [2016] EWHC 2530 (Ch). 
48 Eg Portman Building Society v Dusangh [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221; Jones v Morgan [2001] EWCA Civ 995 at 
[40]. 
49 Chesterfield v Janssen (1751) 2 Ves Sen 125 at 155; 28 ER 82 at 100; Aylesford v Morris (1873) LR 8 Ch App 
484 at 491; Hart v O’Connor [1985] AC 1000 at 1024. 
50 Mander v Evans [2001] 1 WLR 2378, 2385. 
51 Eg Attorney General v Vernon (1685) 1 Vern 370 at 387; 23 ER 528 at 535; Herne v Meeres (1687) 1 Vern 465, 
466; 23 ER 591 at 591.  
52 Evans v Llewellin (1787) 1 Cox Eq Cas 333; 29 ER 1191. 
53 Clark v Malpas (1862) 4 DF & J 401; 45 ER 1238; Fry v Lane (1889) 40 Ch D 312. 
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However, in the modern cases, following the Alec Lobb test, the threshold for 
unconscionable conduct of the stronger party has been raised. The modern approach can be 
illustrated by the decision in Ruddick v Ormston,54 which provides an instructive contrast 
with the approach in the older cases, exemplified by Evans v Llewellin.55 In Evans, two 
brothers, who were poor, conveyed an estate to the defendant, who was affluent, for a 
consideration that was inadequate. They did so without taking time to consider the matter and 
without independent advice. There was no pressure exerted by the stronger party on the poor 
men and no material fact was concealed from them. In fact, the solicitor of the stronger party 
cautioned them to take time to consider the matter and to seek advice, but they declined. 
Nevertheless, it was held that the conduct of the stronger party was unconscionable and relief 
was granted. The court stressed that the stronger party should have insisted on the weaker 
parties taking time to consider the matter and to take advice. However, it was acknowledged 
that the conduct of the stronger party did not involve a high degree of moral culpability and 
there was a specific finding that there was no actual fraud by the stronger party. Thus, 
referring to the conduct of the stronger party, Sir Lloyd Kenyon, MR, stated that ‘I will not 
use any harsh terms, because in truth I do not think that the case calls for it. I will give no 
costs for the same reason’.56  
In Ruddick v Ormston57 the claimant, who had many years of experience in the building 
trade, put an unsolicited leaflet through the door of the defendant, asking to be contacted if 
the defendant was considering selling his flat. The leaflet promised free valuation and no 
legal fees to pay. The defendant contacted the claimant and told him he was interested in 
selling his flat. The defendant was asked to name a price and he put forward £25,000, in 
ignorance of the true value of the property (which was about £55,000). The claimant accepted 
                                                          
54 [2005] EWHC 2547 (Ch). 
55 (1787) 1 Cox Eq Cas 333; 29 ER 1191. 
56 (1787) 1 Cox Eq Cas 333 at 341; 29 ER 1191 at 1194.  
57 [2005] EWHC 2547 (Ch). 
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the price. That agreement was concluded at a meeting between the parties that lasted no more 
than 30 minutes. When the vendor later discovered the true value, he refused to complete the 
transaction and the purchaser claimed specific performance. It was held that the contract was 
unenforceable on a different ground. However, as the court had heard argument on a defence 
based on unconscionability, Patten J. went on to state his conclusions on it. He held that the 
purchaser’s conduct was not unconscionable as there was no pressure from the purchaser and 
no false or misleading representations made to the vendor by the purchaser.  
Yet the purchaser’s conduct was not beyond reproach. The court found that he was aware 
that the price agreed was considerably below the market value of the property and that the 
vendor had not taken any proper advice. Moreover, the purchaser did not honour the promise 
in his leaflet to provide a free valuation. Therefore, the degree of moral culpability in the 
conduct of the purchaser in this case is higher than that of the stronger party in Evans. Not 
only did he allow the vendor to enter into the agreement without taking advice (as in Evans), 
but, in addition, he did not even advise the vendor to seek advice (unlike in Evans) and he 
failed to honour his own promise to provide a free valuation. Whereas the court in Evans 
expected the stronger party to have (actively) insisted on the weaker party taking time to 
consider the matter and to take advice, over two centuries later, the court in Ruddick was 
satisfied that the stronger party was passive in that ‘[t]here was no attempt by [the stronger 
party] to dissuade [the weaker party] from seeking advice.’58  
Similarly, in the more recent case of Evans v Lloyd,59  Evans, acting under a special 
disability, transferred all the property of substance that he owned to the defendants as a gift. 
The defendants knew of the special disability of Evans, but they did not advise him to seek 
independent advice before making the transfer. Yet it was held that the conduct of the 
defendants in accepting the gift in such circumstances was not unconscionable, as they had 
                                                          
58 [2005] EWHC 2547 (Ch) at [33]. 
59 Evans v Lloyd [2013] 2 P & CR DG21; [2013] EWHC 1725 (Ch). 
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not taken active steps to dissuade Evans from seeking independent advice before making the 
transfer. 
Under the modern English cases, the threshold for establishing unconscionable conduct of 
the stronger party is so high that some judges consider that conduct which is sufficient to 
satisfy the requirement of unconscionable conduct for relief on the ground of undue 
influence 60  may not be enough to satisfy the Alec Lobb requirement. In Humphreys v 
Humphreys,61 for example, the court found that the impugned transaction had been induced 
by undue influence, but an alternative claim based on unconscionability failed because, inter 
alia, it was held that the defendant’s conduct was not unconscionable for this purpose. The 
judge stated that the finding of undue influence ‘is not by itself to be equated with a finding 
that [the stronger party] had acted with sufficient moral culpability to enable [the weaker 
party] also to invoke the alternative head of relief’ based on unconscionability. 62 But how 
can the court condemn a defendant’s conduct as amounting to undue influence and yet 
conclude that the same conduct is not unconscionable enough for purposes of relief on the 
ground of unconscionability?  
Whilst a presumption of undue influence can be raised even in the absence of a specific 
act or conduct of the defendant that can be characterised as wrongful, nevertheless if the 
presumption is not rebutted the court intervenes ‘on the basis that a civil wrong has been 
proved.’63 The courts have confirmed on numerous occasions that undue influence, including 
presumed undue influence, is ‘the victimization of one party by the other’,64 and a finding of 
undue influence is a finding that the defendant’s conduct amounts to ‘a civil wrong’,65 and 
specifically a finding that ‘the ascendant party has unfairly exploited the influence he [has] 
                                                          
60 See eg Dunbar Bank Plc v Nadeem [1998] 3 All ER 876 at 883; Daniel v Drew [2005] EWCA Civ 507 at [49].  
61 [2004] EWHC 2201 (Ch) at [106]. 
62 See also Evans v Lloyd [2013] EWHC 1725 (Ch) at [76]. 
63 Nel v Neal [2003] EWHC 190 (QB) at 86. 
64 National Westminster Bank v Morgan [1985] AC 686 at 706. 
65 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773 at [14]; [2001] UKHL 44 at [14]. 
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over the vulnerable party.’66 Since a finding of undue influence (whether actual or presumed) 
is a finding that the stronger party has abused his position of power, it is difficult to see how a 
finding of undue influence will not be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of unconscionable 
conduct on the part of the defendant, for purposes of relief on the ground of 
unconscionability. In such a case, the finding of undue influence only satisfies one of the 
unconscionability criteria. The alternative claim based on uncosncionability will succeed only 
if the other unconscionability criteria are satisfied.  
 
Transactional Imbalance: must it be overreaching and oppressive? 
Even if a claimant was under a special disability and the defendant’s conduct was 
unconscionable, relief will not be available under the Alec Lobb test unless the third element 
of transactional imbalance is also satisfied. In the older cases, it was sufficient that the 
transaction was, from the weaker party’s perspective, ‘an improvident contract’.67 Even under 
the more modern Cresswell formulation, the requirement is satisfied where the transactional 
imbalance was ‘considerable’. However, under the Alec Lobb test, it is no longer enough that 
the transaction was hard or improvident; it must be ‘overreaching and oppressive’.68 The 
question is whether the transaction ‘shocks the conscience of the court’.69 It is not clear 
whether this shift in the threshold was deliberate and the policy rationale for it was not stated 
in Alec Lobb. However, the practical consequence is that in the modern cases this 
requirement has not been satisfied (and so relief has been refused) where the transaction, 
although hard, 70  or improvident 71  or even ‘exceptionally improvident’, 72  was not 
overreaching and oppressive or did not shock the conscience of the court.  
                                                          
66 National Commercial Bank (Jamaica) Ltd v Hew [2003] UKPC 51 at [34] and [30]. 
67 Eg Baker v Monk (1864) 4 De GJ & S 388 at 394; 46 ER 968 at 971. 
68 [1983] 1 WLR 87, 95; Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All ER 144 at 152. 
69 [1983] 1 WLR 87, 95; Godden v Godden [2015] EWHC 2633 (Ch) at [94]. 
70 Eg Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd v Marden [1979] Ch 84 at 112; Singla v Bashir [2002] EWHC 883 (Ch) at [28]. 
71 Portman Building Society v Dusangh [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221. 
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This modern requirement has been described as ‘a stringent one.’ 73  Indeed, it is so 
stringent that the threshold for establishing it is higher than that for the transactional 
imbalance required to raise the presumption of undue influence. One requirement for the 
presumption is that the impugned transaction must be one that ‘calls for explanation’. Since 
this is a pre-condition for the court to presume that the defendant has committed a civil 
wrong, one would expect the law to require a high threshold. And a transaction is one that 
calls for explanation if the transactional imbalance is not readily explicable by the motives on 
which ordinary people act.74 Now, in Humphreys v Humphreys75 a transaction described by 
the judge as ‘a very one-sided one’ satisfied the requirement for the presumption of undue 
influence. However, the judge doubted that the degree of transactional imbalance was 
sufficient to satisfy the requirement for unconscionability. Thus although the judge 
recognised the significance of his finding that the transaction was very one-sided, 
nevertheless he regarded ‘it as questionable whether it was sufficiently disadvantageous for 
the invocation of this head of equitable relief.’ 76  It is recognised that the threshold for 
unconscionability and undue influence need not be identical, since in the case of the former 
transactional imbalance is a criterion for relief whereas in the case of the latter it is a 
requirement for an evidential presumption. However, it is difficult to understand why a 
transaction that is so ‘very one-sided’ that it calls for explanation should not satisfy the 
requirement of transaction imbalance for relief on the ground of unconscionability. 
 
Statutory Protection and Unconscionability 
The discussion in the previous section has sought to show that the Alec Lobb test has 
curtailed the protective reach of unconscionability to such an extent that, in its current 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
72 Eg Kalsep Ltd v X-Flow BV (2001), 9 March, Ch D, Pumfrey J. 
73 Godden v Godden [2015] EWHC 2633 (Ch) at [94]. 
74 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773 at [21]; [2001] UKHL 44 at [21].  
75 [2004] EWHC 2201 (Ch). 
76 At [106]. 
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incarnation, it is unable to provide effective protection to those contracting under 
circumstances of special disadvantage. Yet a call for a more liberal application of 
unconscionability is likely to be resisted on the ground that any protection deficit arising from 
the Alec Lobb effect has now been covered by adequate protection under various statutory 
regimes.77 It may be said that the protection now afforded weaker parties under primary and 
secondary legislation has rendered unconscionability largely redundant in the modern law of 
contract and that there is no need to develop it. However, whilst it is acknowledged that 
statutory regulation of unfairness in contracts has reduced the need for reliance on 
unconscionability in certain areas, it is questionable whether this has turned unconscionability 
into a moribund doctrine that is unworthy of further development.  
It is well known that statutory regulation has expanded in recent years and that much of it 
is designed to protect consumers.78 And it is clear that the availability of a range of different 
remedies under various statutory regimes has impacted on the role of unconsionability in the 
protection of weaker parties. For example, as some statutory regimes now give consumers a 
cooling off period within which they can cancel or withdraw from certain consumer 
contracts,79 a consumer who exercises this statutory right will have no need to resort to 
unconscionability for relief. The same is true of protection available under statutes that give 
the courts wide powers to reopen certain agreements found to be unfair and to make 
appropriate orders to remedy the unfairness.80 Thus prior to the courts being given wide 
powers under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (UK)81 in relation to financial and property 
settlements between divorcing spouses, it was necessary for the court to rely on 
                                                          
77 Eg National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] AC 686 at 708. 
78 See eg Chitty on Contracts, above, n 33, vol 2, Ch 38.  
79 Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/3134 
(UK). 
80 Eg ss 140A and 140B of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (UK). 
81 Ss 23-24B, 24E and 25A. See also sch 5 to the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (UK). 
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unconscionability in order to protect weaker parties against unfairness in such agreements.82 
However, since the entry into force of the statutory regime, unconscionability has become 
redundant in this area, as the courts now use their statutory powers to provide effective 
remedies to weaker parties.83 
In cases where the statutory regime does not provide for the whole agreement to be 
reopened, statutory remedies can be more flexible and easier to access than relief on the 
ground of unconscionability. This is the case where a statute protects the weaker party by 
imposing a term or statutory obligation into a contract. Thus in Part 1 of the Consumer Rights 
Act 2015 (UK) (CRA)84 statutory terms are included into a contract between a trader85 and a 
consumer86 for the sale of goods,87 the supply of digital content88 or the supply of services89 
and the trader cannot exclude or restrict his liability for breach of these terms.90  
And, whereas under English law unconscionability operates by setting aside the whole 
contract, a statute can strike down only a specific term in a contract that is otherwise 
enforceable. Under Part 2 of the CRA, for example, a term (in a consumer contract) which is 
unfair91 is not binding on the consumer.92  
Even in cases where the statutory remedy is similar to rescission on the ground of 
unconscionability, it may be easier to obtain the statutory remedy. The Consumer Protection 
from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (UK)93  prohibits traders from engaging in unfair 
                                                          
82 Notably Cresswell v Potter, decided in 1968, but reported ten years later in [1978] 1 WLR 255. 
83 Eg Backhouse v Backhouse [1978] 1 WLR 243; Butlin-Sanders v Butlin [1985] Fam Law 126. 
84 Which implements the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees Directive, 1999/44/EEC (EU) 
formerly implemented in the Sale and Supply of Goods and Services Regulations 2002 (SI 2002 No 045) (UK).  
85 Defined in s 2(2) as a person acting for purposes relating to his trade, business, craft, or profession. 
86 Defined in s 2(3) as an individual acting for purposes that are wholly or mainly outside that individual’s trade, 
business, craft or profession. 
87 Ss 9 to 13. 
88 See ss 34 to 37.  
89 Ss 49-52.  
90 See ss 31, 47 and 57. 
91 As defined in s 62(4). 
92 S 62(1). See also s 65(1). 
93 SI 2008 No 1277. 
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commercial practices, 94  which includes misleading action, 95  misleading omission, 96 
aggressive practice 97  and those practices listed in schedule 1 of the Regulations. 98  The 
Regulations 99  now give the consumer three new private remedies against a trader 100  to 
‘unwind’ the contract, claim a discount or claim damages.101 The right to unwind a contract is 
similar to the remedy of rescission for unconscionability.102 However, to unwind a contract, it 
is not necessary to show that the claimant was under a special disability or that there was a 
significant imbalance in the resulting transaction to the disadvantage of the weaker party. The 
claimant only needs to show that he was a consumer, 103  that the trader engaged in a 
commercial practice that is a misleading action104  or aggressive practice 105  and that the 
prohibited commercial practice was a significant factor in the claimant’s decision to enter 
into the contract. 
Moreover, under statutory regulation, in addition to private rights of action, consumers can 
benefit from enforcement by a regulator. Thus, the CRA confers investigatory and other 
enforcement powers on the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and other 
regulators106 in relation to enforcement of Part 2.107 These include the power to consider a 
complaint about a relevant term in a trader’s contract108 and the power to apply to a court for 
an injunction109 against a person if the regulator thinks that the person is using or proposing 
                                                          
94 Reg 3(1). 
95 As defined in reg 5. 
96 As defined in reg 6. 
97 As defined in reg 7. 
98 Reg 3(4)(d). 
99 As amendment by the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations 2014 (UK). 
100 In relation to contracts concluded from 1 October 2014. 
101 Reg 27E-J. 
102 Regs 27F(1) and 27G(5). 
103 Defined in reg 2(1). 
104 Under reg 5. 
105 Under reg 7. 
106 Listed in paragraph 8(1) of sch 3. 
107 See s 70 and schedules 3 and 5. 
108 Para 2 of sch 3. 
109 See eg Office of Fair Trading v Foxtons Ltd [2010] 1 WLR 663; [2009] EWCA Civ 288 (injunction granted). 
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to use a term that is unfair.110 Similarly, under the 2008 Regulations, it is an offence for a 
trader to engage in misleading action,111 misleading omission or aggressive practice112 and 
the criminal remedies are enforced by designated enforcement authorities113 for the benefit of 
consumers.114 
However, although statutory regulation has provided weaker parties with a substantial 
degree of protection from exploitation and, as a result, they do not need to rely on 
unconscionability in the areas within the scope of the relevant legislation, unconscionability 
still serves an important role in the law’s response to unfairness in contracts, alongside 
statutory regulation and the other common law and equitable doctrines, such as 
misrepresentation, mistake, duress and undue influence. Indeed, it is arguable that the current 
English version of unconscionability needs to be developed to enable it to provide adequate 
protection to persons contracting under circumstances of special disability in a variety of 
transactions. First, statutory regulation usually deals with very specific issues and leaves 
weaker parties without protection in areas outside the scope of the legislation in question. For 
example, the private rights of redress under the 2008 Regulations do not extend to contracts 
for the sale of immoveable property.115 Consequently, a complainant such as the vendor in 
Ruddick v Ormston, discussed above, remains unprotected by the Regulations. Such a 
complainant would therefore benefit from protection through a more liberal application of 
unconscionability.  
Secondly, even in cases where the weaker party can in principle exercise the relevant 
statutory right, there may be express limitations to the exercise of the remedy. For example, 
the statutory cooling off period within which a consumer may withdraw from specified 
                                                          
110 See sch 3, paras 3 and 4.  
111 Otherwise than by reason of the practice satisfying the condition in reg 5(3)(b) 
112 Regs 9 to 11. 
113 Reg 2 and Part 4. 
114 Eg R v Jackson [2017] EWCA Crim 78. 
115 Reg 27C. 
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transactions is rightly very short116 and the right to unwind a business to consumer contract 
under the 2008 Regulations is also short-lived and expires after 90 days.117 A consumer who 
fails to exercise the statutory right within the time limit may need to rely on 
unconscionability for relief.118  
Thirdly, in certain cases, statutory protection of consumers may not extend as far as a 
more expansive doctrine of unconscionability. For example, the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999 (UK) (UTCCR), now Part 2 of the CRA, was intended to protect 
the consumer against unfair contract terms. However, in so far as a term in a consumer 
contract was in plain and intelligible language the term could not be assessed for unfairness 
in relation to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract or the adequacy of the 
price or remuneration as against the goods or services supplied in exchange.119 As a result, 
where terms in banking contracts allowed banks to levy huge charges on personal current 
account customers in respect of unauthorised overdrafts, the UK Supreme Court held that, as 
the terms were in plain and intelligible language, no assessment of the terms for unfairness 
under UTCCR could relate to the adequacy of the charges levied as against the services 
supplied.120 That decision was controversial because it was seen by some as failing to give 
consumers the protection they needed. UTCCR has been repealed and the wording in Pt 2 of 
the CRA, which replaces UTCCR, is slightly different.121 But the case would probably be 
decided in the same way under the CRA, if the terms were found to be ‘transparent and 
                                                          
116 Fourteen days. 
117 Reg 27E(1)(3) and (4). 
118 Although a defence of laches is available, the time period is not limited to 90 days. 
119 Reg 6(2). 
120 The Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National Bank Plc [2010] 1 AC 696; [2009] UKSC 6. 
121 Section 64(2) excludes a term from an assessment for unfairness only where the term is ‘transparent and 
prominent’. 
22 
 
prominent’. 122  However, the doctrine of unconscionability, which allows adequacy of 
consideration to be taken into account, can be used to challenge such charges.123 
Fourthly, statutory regulation is mostly focused on the protection of consumers, leaving 
other weaker parties, including those who fall just outside the statutory definition of a 
consumer, to seek protection elsewhere. Thus, the protection provided by the CRA does not 
extend to an individual who, solely for purposes of his trade, business or profession, enters 
into a contract with a large company. Yet it is not uncommon for such individuals to find 
themselves in circumstances in which they need protection in their dealings with by large 
companies.124 In such cases, unconscionability can provide the necessary protection,125 as is 
the case in some jurisdictions.126   
Even in the context of transactions between business entities, it is possible for a very large 
corporation to take unfair advantage of the circumstances of a small business. In such cases 
too, unconscionability can provide protection to the small business, as it has done in other 
jurisdictions such as Canada127 and the USA.128  
Furthermore, there is an international trend in favour of unconscionability or equivalent 
doctrine, beyond common law jurisdictions where the doctrine already exists. Thus in some 
civil law countries, where the doctrine or similar did not exist, unconscionability-type 
grounds of relief are now being adopted. 129  For example, until very recently, an 
                                                          
122 As defined in s 64(3) and (4). 
123 Eg the attempt in Florida, USA, in In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, 694 F Supp 2d 1302 (S D Fla 
2010). Of course such a claim will only succeed if all the unconscionability criteria are satisfied. In the 
Australian case of Paciocco v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2016] 258 CLR 525; [2016] HCA 28, a statutory 
unconscionability claim in relation to bank charges for late payment of credit card balances failed because the 
claimant did not satisfy the statutory conditions for relief. 
124 See eg Greenwood Forest Products (UK) Ltd v Roberts, QB 12 March 2010. 
125 Cf LSREF III Achill Investments Ltd v Corbett [2015] IEHC 652 at [36]-[37]. 
126 See eg in Canada, Ohlson v CIBC (1997) A R 140 and in the USA, Shell Oil Co. v Marinello, 307 A.2d 598 (N J 
Supp Ct 1973); Johnson v Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F Supp 264 (Mich 1976).  
127 Eg Atlas Supply of Canada v Yarmouth Equipment Ltd [1991] 103 NSR (2d) 1; Plas-Tex Canada Ltd v Dow 
Chemical (Canada) Ltd [2004] 245 DLR (4th) 650; 2004 ABCA 309. 
128 Eg Spectrum Networks Inc v Plus Realty Inc, 878 N E 2d 1122 (Ohio Com Pl 2007). See also, DJ Coleman Inc v 
Nufarm Americas Inc, 693 F Supp 2d 1055 (D N Dak 2010). 
129 Eg art 1118 of the Luxembourg Civil Code (inserted by enactment of 15 May 1987). 
23 
 
unconscionability-type ground of relief was not available under the French Civil Code.130 As 
a result the French courts had to manipulate and strain other doctrines (such as mistake, 
fraud, duress) in order to provide weaker parties with effective protection against 
exploitation.131 However, following a recent reform of the contract law provisions of the 
Civil Code, the new Civil Code (2016)132 makes provision for the courts to intervene on a 
ground similar to unconscionability. Thus, in addition to relief on the traditional ground of 
duress under arts 1140-1142, relief is now available under art 1143, also for duress, ‘where 
one contracting party exploits the other’s state of dependence and obtains an undertaking to 
which the latter would not have agreed in the absence of such constraint, and gains from it a 
manifestly excessive advantage.’133 Although this new ground of relief is described in art 
1143 as duress, in terms of the elements required for relief, it is more closely related to the 
English doctrine of unconscionability.  
The growing adoption of unconscionability-type ground of relief extends to international 
soft law instruments and proposals, including art 3.2.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (2016) (UNIDROIT Principles), art 4:109 of the 
Principles of European Contract Law (1995) (PECL) and art III-7:207 of the Draft Common 
Frame of Reference (DCFR). At a time when internationally there appears to be a rising tide 
in favour of unconscionability or equivalent, it would be strange for English law to allow this 
ground of relief to become obsolescent. 
 
                                                          
130 Relief on the ground of laesio enormis or lesion (art 1118) was very restricted and applied only to certain 
contracts (eg contracts for the sale of immovable property (art 1674) or to protect certain persons, such as 
minors (arts 1305 et seq).  
131 eg Deparis c Assurance Mutuelles de France, Civ 30 May 2000, D 2000. 879, note J-P Chazal and 2001. 1140, 
obs D Mazeaud; Larousse-Bordas c Kannas, Civ 3 April 2002, D 2002. 1860, note J-P Gridel, 1862, note J-P 
Chazal, and 2844, obs D Mazeaud; Sté Abri c Sté Boursorama, Com 16 October 2007, no 05-19069.  
132 Promulgated by Ordinance No 2016-131 of 10 February 2016, on the reform of the law of contract, the 
general regime of obligations and proof of obligations.  
133  Translation from French by J Cartwright, B Fauvarque-Cosson and S Whittaker, available at 
www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/THE-LAW-OF-CONTRACT-2-5-16.PDF, accessed on 7 December 2017. 
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How should the English Doctrine be developed?  
If, as suggested above, notwithstanding the extent of statutory regulation, there is still an 
important role for unconscionability in the modern law of contract, but the Alec Lobb 
approach has eroded its protective power, how should the doctrine be developed to enable it 
to discharge its office more effectively and without undermining the general enforceability of 
contracts? In considering the shape that the future development of the doctrine may take, this 
section first examines existing suggestions in favour of merging unconscionability with other 
related doctrines before advancing another option for developing the modern English 
doctrine. 
 
Merger with other Doctrines? 
Some commentators have suggested that unconscionability should be merged with one or 
more of the other vitiating factors (including duress, undue influence, and mistake) to form 
one wider doctrine of unconscionability.134 These suggestions have a certain attraction, as 
unconscionability shares some features with the other vitiating factors. However, the concern 
is that a merged doctrine would be too vague. What, for example, would be the elements 
required for relief on the ground of this wider doctrine? It is perhaps for this reason that Lord 
Denning’s famous attempt to introduce a similar general principle of ‘inequality of 
                                                          
134 There are variants of this approach. Some advocate a merger with undue influence (Capper, above., n 9; 
Devenney and Chandler, above, n 20), others would like economic duress to be absorbed as well (A Phang, 
‘Undue Influence Methodology, Sources and Linkages’ [1995] JBL 552), and some prefer the merged doctrine 
also to include mistake (J Phillips, ‘Protecting Those in a Disadvantageous Negotiating Position: Unconscionable 
Bargains as a Unifying Doctrine’ (2010) 45 Wake Forest L Rev 837 at pp 849 and following.). 
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bargaining power’,135 in Lloyd’s Bank Ltd v Bundy,136 did not prosper in England137 and other 
common law jurisdictions, with the exception of Canada.138 
Another suggestion is for an even wider doctrine of unconscionability which would 
embrace not only the vitiating factors, but also a wide range of instances when the court 
intervenes because of underlying concerns about unfairness in the transaction, including, for 
example, the rules relating to the incorporation and interpretation of exemption clauses in 
contracts and the rules on forfeiture and penalty clauses.139 It is interesting to note that some 
aspects of this idea have been embraced in Canada where the courts use unconscionability to 
strike down unfair exemption clauses140 and in determining the enforceability of forfeiture 
and penalty clauses.141  
However, it is submitted that the English courts should hesitate long before going down a 
similar path. Apart from the objection that such a wide doctrine of unconscionability would 
be too vague and elusive, there would be practical difficulties, for example, in absorbing the 
English forfeiture and penalty rules into a wider doctrine of unconscionability, as there are 
important differences between them. First, whereas in the case of relief against a penalty or 
forfeiture the court only refuses to give full force to the impugned contractual provision and 
the contract as a whole may be kept alive,142 in the case of unconscionability the whole 
                                                          
135 Embracing five separate categories of case where relief is available: (a) duress of goods, (b) unconscionable 
transaction, (c) undue influence, (d) undue pressure, and (e) salvage agreements.  
136 [1975] QB 326, 339.  
137 The doctrine was not endorsed by the other members of the Court of Appeal in the Bundy case itself and it 
was later rejected by the House of Lords in National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] AC 686 at 707-708. 
138 Eg McKenzie v Bank of Montreal (1976) 70 DLR (3d) 113; Norberg v Wynrib [1992] 2 SCR 226 at [31]. 
139 S M Waddams, ‘Unconscionability in Contracts’ (1976) 39 MLR 369. 
140Tercon Contractors Ltd v British Columbia (Transportation and Highways) [2010] 1 SCR 69 at [122]-[123]; 
2010 SCC 4 at [122]-123]; ABB Inc v Domtar Inc [2007] 3 SCR 461 at [82]; 2007 SCC 50 at [82]; Plas-Tex Canada 
Ltd v Dow Chemical of Canada Ltd (2004) 245 DLR (4th) 650; 2004 ABCA 309. 
141 Eg Peachtree II Associates – Dallas LP v 857486 Ontario Ltd (2005) 76 OR (3d) 362 at [32]; [2005 OJ No 2749 
at [32]; Birch v Union of Taxation Employees Local 70030 (2008) 93 OR (3d) 1; 2008 ONCA 809. 
142 Thus in the case of a forfeiture clause, in the ordinary course the court will only grant relief on the basis that 
the breach is rectified by performance, albeit late: Cukurova Finance International Ltd v Alfa Telecom Turkey 
Ltd [2016] AC 923; [2013] UKPC 20. Of course in the case of a penalty clause the contract will be terminated 
where the breach is a repudiatory breach which is accepted by the innocent party.  
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contract is voidable and, under English law, the normal remedy is rescission, 143 subject to 
conditions where necessary. The position is different in some jurisdictions where the courts 
can strike down an objectionable clause or limit its application and enforce the remainder of 
the contract.144  
Secondly, when applying the doctrine of unconscionability the court is concerned with the 
defendant’s conduct at the time of conclusion of the contract, but when applying the 
forfeiture rule the court is concerned with the circumstances after formation of the contract. 
In the case of relief against forfeiture the question is whether, in the light of the 
circumstances after conclusion of the contract,145 it is unconscionable for the party seeking 
enforcement to insist on the strict terms of the contract. 
Thirdly, for the court to intervene on the ground of unconscionability it is an essential 
requirement that the stronger party took unfair advantage of the circumstances of the weaker 
party, but that is not the case with the rule against penalties, which is rather a rule for 
controlling remedies for breach of contract.146 The penalty rule is concerned with the question 
whether the impugned clause served or protected a legitimate commercial interest and, if so, 
whether in the circumstances the obligations imposed by the clause (such as the amount 
payable) were exorbitant, extravagant or unconscionable.147 In other words, the penalty rule, 
unlike the unconscionability doctrine, does not depend for its operation on a finding that one 
                                                          
143 In some cases, where the stronger party seeks to enforce the contract by requesting an order for specific 
performance, the remedy will be a refusal to grant specific performance.  
144 eg, in the USA, under statutes based on section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code and see also, 
American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Contracts, s. 208, in Australia see Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete 
(SA) Pty Ltd [1995] HCA 14; (1995) 184 CLR 102 and in Canada see the cases in notes 140 and 141 above.  
145 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2016] AC 1172 (hereafter ‘Makdessi’) at [227] and [294]; [2015] 
UKSC 67 at [227] and [294]; Stockloser v Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476 at 492; 
146 Makdessi [2016] AC 1172 at [42]; [2015] UKSC 67 at [42]. 
147 Makdessi [2016] AC 1172 at [152]; [2015] UKSC 67 at [152]. 
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party took unfair advantage of the other, 148  even though the court may consider the 
circumstances in which the contract was made.149 
Moreover, if, as suggested in this paper, the problem with the modern English doctrine of 
unconscionability is that weaker parties now face almost insurmountable hurdles to obtain 
relief, then it is not clear what, if anything, is to be gained by simply gathering existing 
grounds of relief under an umbrella doctrine, if nothing is done about the high thresholds of 
the current criteria for relief.  
 
Re-visiting the Unconscionability Criteria 
A possible approach to the development of the current English doctrine is to retain 
unconscionability as an independent ground of relief, distinct and separate from other 
grounds, but to re-consider the criteria. If, as suggested in this paper, the law has taken a 
wrong turn in the way in which the Alec Lobb criteria have been adopted and applied, then in 
order to put the law on the right track it would be necessary to re-visit the criteria. As part of 
that exercise, it is helpful to interrogate the fundamental purpose or function of the 
unconscionability jurisdiction, since the criteria are there to ensure that relief is available in 
accordance with the purpose of the jurisdiction. Whilst judges have not always stated the 
purpose of unconscionability in the same way over the years, it is generally accepted that the 
court intervenes on this ground to prevent one party from taking unfair or unconscientious 
advantage of another person who is contracting under circumstances of special 
disadvantage.150 It is said that unconscionability seeks to protect against ‘victimisation’,151 or 
                                                          
148 Imperial Tobacco Company (of Great Britain and Ireland) v Parslay [1936] 2 All ER 515 at 523; Makdessi 
[2016] AC 1172 at [34]; [2015] UKSC 67 at [34];  
149 Makdessi [2016] AC 1172 at [35] and [152]; [2015] UKSC 67 at [35] and [152]. 
150 Eg Cory v Cory (1747) 1 Ves Sen 19; 27 ER 864; Hunter Engineering Co v Syncrude Canada Ltd [1989] 1 SCR 
426 at 516; Kakavas v Crowne Melbourne Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 392 (hereafter ‘Kakavas’) at [6]; (2013) 298 ALR 
35 at [6]; [2013] HCA 25 at [6].  
151 E.g. Hart v O’Connor [1985] AC 1000 at 1024; Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621 at 628, 630, 638. 
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the ‘exploitation’ of the weaker party’s vulnerability.152 This raises two main questions. First, 
what category of persons does the jurisdiction seek to protect? Next, what constitutes the 
unconscientious taking of advantage in this context?  
Concerning the first question, it has long been established that the doctrine seeks to protect 
persons who, owing to their condition or circumstances at the time of contracting, are ‘unable 
to judge for [themselves]’.153 This aspect of the purpose of unconscionability is now reflected 
in the first Alec Lobb criterion (special disability). As explained above, this requirement has 
been given a sufficiently expansive scope in the modern English authorities. There is, 
therefore, no need for the present approach to be modified.  
In relation to the unfair or unconscientious taking of advantage, a distinction is usually 
drawn between ‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ unfairness.154 The former is concerned with the 
unfair manner in which the intention to enter into a transaction was made. It includes cases of 
consent affected by vitiating factors such as misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence. 
Substantive unfairness or transactional imbalance is concerned with unfairness in the terms of 
the contract itself. It is widely accepted that unconscionability is concerned with procedural 
unfairness, although, as discussed below, there are differences of opinion on what constitutes 
or should constitute procedural unfairness for purposes of unconscionability. But there is 
debate as to whether, in addition to procedural unfairness, unconscionability should be 
concerned with transactional imbalance. It is helpful to consider these two issues in turn. 
 
Procedural unfairness: unconscionable conduct of the stronger party 
Since the purpose of equity’s intervention on the ground of unconscionability is to prevent 
the stronger party from taking unconscientious advantage of the special disability of the 
                                                          
152 Lawrence v Poorah [2008] UKPC 21 at [20]; Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621 at 626; Kakavas (2013) 250 
CLR 392 at [161]; (2013) 298 ALR 35 at [161]; [2013] HCA 25 at [161]. 
153 Chesterfield v Janssen (1751) 2 Ves Sen 125 at 156; 28 ER 82 at 100. 
154 Eg Hart v O’Connor [1985] 1 AC 1000 at 1017-18. 
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weaker party, it is widely accepted that for relief to be available on this ground the conduct of 
the stronger party must have been unconscionable. However, unconscionable conduct covers 
a wide variety of conduct (including conduct falling short of actual fraud or other legal 
wrong) which equity regards as morally culpable. The point at which the line is drawn on the 
spectrum of morally culpable conduct would restrict or extend the protective reach of 
unconscionability. It has been argued above that the modern English authorities have raised 
the threshold for unconscionable conduct to such a high level that it has become extremely 
difficult for claimants to establish this requirement in many cases. However, in other 
jurisdictions the threshold is not so high. 
In Australia, for example, although in recent years the courts have appeared to be raising 
the bar in relation to this element,155 the threshold is still lower than that under English law.156 
What the claimant needs to show is ‘conduct on the part of the defendant, beyond the 
ordinary conduct of the [relevant] business, which makes it just to require the defendant to 
restore the plaintiff to his or her previous position.’157 That the Australian courts take a more 
liberal approach to this than their English counterparts can be seen in the context of a 
transaction between a bank (as lender) and an individual mortgagor who is under a special 
disability. Where the bank was concerned to ensure that the loan was amply secured but 
failed to make relevant enquiries about the capacity of the mortgagor to repay the loan, in 
Australia such conduct has been held to be unconscionable,158 but under the modern English 
approach it would appear that such conduct is not unconscionable.159  
                                                          
155 See eg Kakavas (2013) 250 CLR 392; (2013) 298 ALR 35; [2013] HCA 25, discussed below. 
156 Comp eg the English case of Evans v Lloyd [2013] 2 P & CR DG21; [2013] EWHC 113 (Ch), discussed above, 
with the Australian case of Aboody v Ryan, 2012 NSWCA 395, esp at [68] and [69].  
157 Kakavas (2013) 250 CLR 392 at [20]; (2013) 298 ALR 35 at [20]; [2013] HCA 25 at [20]. 
158 See eg Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd [2002] NSWCA 413 at [57]-[59]; Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd 
v Khoshaba [2006] NSWCA 41; Gray v Small [2004] NSWSC 97.  
159 Portman Building Society v Dusangh [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221.  
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Similarly, in New Zealand the requirement160 can be satisfied in circumstances where it 
would fail under the modern English approach. In Moffat v Moffat,161 for example, the court 
granted relief where there was no finding of fraud or oppression on the part of the stronger 
party. The weaker party acted hastily and foolishly in agreeing to the transaction. She was 
advised to obtain independent advice, but she declined (just like the claimants in Evans v 
Llewellin). A submission that the court could not intervene on the ground of 
unconscionability unless there was some over-reaching by the stronger party (a submission 
that is consistent with the modern English approach) was firmly rejected by the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal. Hardy Boys J. explained that the weaker party did not have to establish 
actual fraud ‘or even active moral delinquency on [the part of the stronger party]; but rather 
that her disability was sufficiently evident to [the stronger party], or ought reasonably to have 
been so, to render it unfair for him to obtain or accept her assent to the transaction’.162 This 
test is not confined to property settlement agreements between divorcing spouses; it applies 
to other transactions, such as sales of land.163 The approach in New Zealand is therefore more 
closely allied to that of the older English cases than that of the modern ones (such as 
Ruddick). 
The approach of the courts in Australia and New Zealand indicates that a possible 
response to the problem of the current high threshold under English law may be to revise it 
downwards. In this regard, a possible test for unconscionable conduct of the stronger party is 
whether, at the time of the transaction, the stronger party knew of the special disability of the 
weaker party and either took active steps to overreach the weaker party or failed to take 
reasonable steps to satisfy herself that the effects of the special disability had been repaired 
before entering into the impugned transaction. There are two main aspects to this 
                                                          
160 Gustav & Co Ltd v Macfield Ltd [2008] 2 NZLR 735 at [6]; [2008] NZSC 47 at [6].  
161 [1984] 1 NZLR 600. 
162 At 606. 
163 See eg Nichols v Jessup [1986] 1 NZLR 226 at 234 and 235. 
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formulation. It may be helpful to deal with the state of knowledge of the stronger party before 
turning to how, with such knowledge, the stronger party conducted herself. 
Concerning the state of knowledge of the stronger party, it is generally accepted that actual 
knowledge, which includes wilful blindness or wilful ignorance, is sufficient.164 However, 
there is a lively debate as to whether constructive notice should also be sufficient. On this 
point, the position of English law seems unsettled.165 But in Australia it has been decided, in 
Kakavas, 166  that constructive notice is not sufficient. 167  In that case, the High Court of 
Australia also stated that mere inadvertence, or even indifference, to the circumstances of the 
other party to an arm’s length commercial transaction is not sufficient; the stronger party 
must have had a predatory state of mind.168  That decision has been subjected to some 
criticism.169  
However, it is submitted that constructive notice should not be sufficient for this purpose. 
If, as discussed above, the fundamental purpose of unconscionability is to prevent the 
stronger party from taking unconscientious advantage of the special disability of the weaker 
party, then the jurisdiction can only be invoked where the conscience of the stronger party is 
affected. Where the stronger party does not have actual knowledge (including wilful 
ignorance), it is difficult to see how his or her conscience can be affected simply by fixing 
him or her with constructive notice. The doctrine of constructive notice is relevant to priority 
as between competing property interests.170 In that context, a person who did not have actual 
knowledge (including wilful blindness) may be fixed with constructive notice where he failed 
                                                          
164 Owen and Gutch v Homan (1853) 4 HLC 997 at 1035; 10 ER 752 at 767. 
165 Comp Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All ER 144 at 152-152 and Portman Building 
Society v Dusangh [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221. 
166 (2013) 250 CLR 392; (2013) 298 ALR 35; [2013] HCA 25 
167 See also Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395 at 410-411 [39]. 
168 At [161]. 
169 R Bigwood, ‘Still Curbing Unconscionability: Kakavas in the High Court of Australia’ (2013) 37 Melb U L Rev 
463. 
170 Re Montagu’s Settlement Trusts [1978] 1 Ch 264 at 272-3. See also Arthur v The Attorney General of the 
Turks & Caicos Islands [2012] UKPC 30 at [36]. 
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to make inquiries or investigations which a reasonable person ought to have made, whether 
the failure was due to negligence or inadvertence. The courts have resisted attempts to apply 
constructive notice beyond cases concerned with priority as between competing property 
interests, 171  especially to cases where the question is whether the defendant had such 
knowledge as to make his conduct unconscionable. 172  The reason is that a person’s 
conscience cannot be affected by a particular situation if he did not have actual knowledge of 
that situation. It is true that a person who did not have actual knowledge of the special 
disability of the weaker party because of a negligent failure to make inquiries which a 
reasonable person ought to have made may be said to be at fault, but such fault (negligence) 
does not transform his conduct into one that is unconscionable.  
In the recent Canadian case of Downer v Pitcher173 the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland 
and Labrador, refusing to follow Kakavas, held that constructive notice should be sufficient 
knowledge in this context. Green CJNL, with whose judgment Harrington and Hoegg JJA 
agreed, argued that, while the unconscionability jurisdiction has to be based on ‘some degree 
of fault or responsibility’ on the part of the stronger party, there is no reason why equity’s 
fastening of the conscience of the defendant to justify relief cannot include ‘other forms of 
fault’ as well as actual knowledge of special disability.174 With respect, the problem with this 
reasoning is that those ‘other forms of fault’, such as negligence or inadvertence, do not 
sufficiently affect a person’s conscience for it to be right to castigate the person’s conduct as 
unconscionable. 
Regarding the behaviour of the stronger party, who has the requisite knowledge, there is 
little difficulty where he or she takes active steps to overreach the weaker party, for example, 
                                                          
171 Eg Manchester Trust v Furness [1895] 2 QB 539 at 545. 
172 For example, in the context of liability for knowing receipt of trust property transferred in breach of trust: 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele [2001] Ch 437; Arthur v The Attorney 
General of the Turks & Caicos Islands [2012] UKPC 30 at [36].  
173 2017 NLCA 13. 
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by applying pressure through repeated requests or by dissuading the weaker party from 
seeking independent advice. But where the stronger party does not take such active steps, the 
modern English cases tend to regard passive acceptance as insufficient to satisfy the 
requirement. 175   However, under the proposed test, passive acceptance may constitute 
unconscionable conduct where the stronger party failed to take reasonable steps to satisfy 
himself that the effects of the special disability had been repaired before the transaction was 
concluded. In terms of the actual steps that the stronger party ought to take, these would 
depend on the circumstances of each case. But the mere fact that the stronger party did not 
take active steps to get the better of the weaker party would not make his conduct morally 
blameless. For example, in a case where the special disability was due to ignorance of a 
specific matter, which was known to the stronger party, the reasonable step may be to 
disclose the information to the weaker party before conclusion of the transaction. In other 
cases, the reasonable step may be for the stronger party proactively to insist that the weaker 
party should obtain independent advice before entering into the transaction.  
It should be noted that the reasonable steps to be taken by the stronger party would not 
necessarily remove all the effects of the special disability in every case,176 but they would 
increase the likelihood that those effects would be remedied before the proposed transaction 
is concluded. Further, taking the reasonable steps would mean that the conscience of the 
stronger party (which was affected by knowledge of the special disability) would no longer 
be affected and therefore his conduct, in entering into the transaction with the weaker party, 
would not be unconscionable.  
The approach of the Court of Appeal in Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v 
Ali (No 1)177 is close to the suggested test. In that case, in the context of a general release of 
                                                          
175 Exemplified in Ruddick and in Evans v Lloyds, discussed above. 
176 The stronger party cannot be expected to take steps that will actually remove the effects of the special 
disability by, for example, providing the weaker party with competent independent advice. 
177 [2000] ICR 1410. 
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claims, the court held by a majority178 that where, at the time of the release, the beneficiary of 
the release (in that case, a bank) knew that the other party (an employee) had or might have a 
claim and knew also that the other party was ignorant of it, this was unconscionable conduct 
and equity could intervene to give relief on the ground of unconscionability. In the House of 
Lords the case was decided on a different ground so that it was not necessary to reach a 
decision on the unconscionable conduct point.179 However, Lord Nicholls referred to such 
conduct as ‘sharp practice’ and agreed that the law would give a remedy in such a case, 
although he left open the precise route by which the law would provide the remedy.180 Lord 
Hoffmann also agreed with the majority in the Court of Appeal that the beneficiary of a 
general release could not be allowed to take advantage of such sharp practice.181 Although 
this case was concerned with the specific context of a general release of claims, the approach 
on the issue of the conduct of the stronger party is consistent with the test proposed in this 
paper, in that the stronger party (the bank) knew that the weaker party (the employee) was 
under a special disability (ignorance), but failed to provide him with the relevant information 
before he signed the release. 
What would be the practical effect of the proposed test? It would extend the protective 
reach of unconscionability under English law, in that cases such as Ruddick and Evans v 
Lloyds would be decided differently on this point, since in each the stronger party was aware 
that the weaker party was under a special disability, but failed to advise him to seek 
independent advice182 before entering into the agreement. Yet the proposed test would not 
jeopardise the enforceability of contracts, as the complainant would still have to establish that 
at the time of the transaction the stronger party was aware of the special disability of the 
                                                          
178 Sir Richard Scott V-C and Chadwick L.J., Buxton L.J. reserving his opinion on the point. 
179 [2002] 1 AC 251; [2001] UKHL/8 
180 At [32]-[33]. 
181 At [70]-[71]. 
182 In Ruddick the stronger party also failed to provide the weaker party the promised free valuation. 
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weaker party.  This is not an easy burden to discharge,183 especially in cases where the 
weaker party was represented by a solicitor.184  
 
Should the requirement of transactional imbalance be abandoned? 
There is a growing debate as to whether the doctrine of unconscionability should be 
concerned with transactional imbalance at all. Some have argued185  that the purpose of 
unconscionability should be to protect the weaker party from procedural unfairness alone and 
therefore transactional imbalance should be abandoned as a criterion for relief, although it 
would remain relevant for its evidential value in relation to procedural unfairness. This 
approach appears to have been adopted by the courts in Australia186 and New Zealand.187 
More recently, the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal 188  expressly and 
emphatically rejected transactional imbalance as a requirement for relief. However, this 
element remains a prerequisite for relief under English law and part of the contention of this 
paper is that the modern English authorities, following Alec Lobb, have raised the threshold 
for this requirement to a level that is too high. Although this problem would simply fall away 
if the requirement of transactional imbalance were to be abolished, it is submitted that this 
would not be the right response to the problem.  
Unconscionability should not be assimilated with the doctrines concerned with procedural 
unfairness alone, such as misrepresentation, duress, and undue influence, as the function of 
unconscionability is different. It seeks to prevent one party taking unconscientious advantage 
                                                          
183 See eg Liddle v Cree [2011] EWHC 3294 (Ch); Gustav & Co Ltd v Macfield Ltd [2008] 2 NZLR 735; [2008] NZSC 
47 and Kakavas (2013) 250 CLR 392; (2013) 298 ALR 35; [2013] HCA 25. 
184 Eg Jones v Morgan [2001] EWCA Civ 995. 
185 Eg R Bigwood, ‘Antipodean Reflections on the Canadian Unconscionability Doctrine’ (2005) 84 Can Bar Rev 
171; S M Waddams, The Law of Contracts, Canada Law Books Inc, Toronto, 2010, p 399; M McInnes, The 
Canadian Law of Unjust Enrichment and Restitution, Lexis Nexis, Markham, 2014, p 552. 
186 See Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 at 462, 474-475, 489; Kakavas (2013) 250 
CLR 392 at [118]; (2013) 298 ALR 35 at [118]; [2013] HCA 25 at [118]. 
187 See Gustav & Co Ltd v Macfield Ltd [2008] 2 NZLR 735 at [6]; [2008] NZSC 47 at [6]; Hildred v Strong [2008] 2 
NZLR 629 at [50]; [2007] NZCA 475 at [50]. 
188 Downer v Pitcher, 2017 NLCA 13. 
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of the special disability of the other party to procure or accept a transaction that is 
substantively unfair. Even in the early cases, relief was not available where the transaction 
was fair or reasonable. 189  Under English law, the position has not changed. An 
‘unconscionable bargain’ is, as Lord Brightman explained in Hart v O’Connor,190 ‘a bargain 
of an improvident character’ made by a person under a special disability acting without 
independent advice. The difference between the function of unconscionability, which is 
concerned with unfairness in the terms of the transaction, and that of the doctrines concerned 
with procedural unfairness alone is to some extent reflected in the difference in the available 
remedies. Thus, under English law, damages are not available for unconscionability 191 
whereas they are available for misrepresentation, duress192  and, in the form of equitable 
compensation, for breach of fiduciary duty and undue influence.193 To discard substantive 
unfairness as a requirement for relief on the ground of unconscionability is to alter the 
founding purpose (and nature) of the doctrine. To do this, it may be necessary to reconsider 
what amounts to procedural unfairness in this context (that is to say, what amounts to 
unconscionable conduct of the stronger party), since the present test for procedural unfairness 
is constructed on the basis that there is a further check or criterion for relief to be available.  
Further, cases where there is procedural unfairness, but it is not such as to attract relief 
under one of the doctrines concerned with procedural unfairness alone, and where the terms 
of the resulting transaction are fair, so that relief is not available on the ground of 
unconscionability, are very exceptional. It is arguable that to discard transactional imbalance 
                                                          
189 Eg Cory v Cory (1747) 1 Ves Sen 19; 27 ER 864. 
190 [1985] 1 AC 1000, at 1024. 
191 Eg Norwich Union Life Insurance Society v Qureshi [1999] Lloyd’s Rep. IR 263. Contra, in Canada equitable 
compensation may be available for unconscionability: Rick v Brandsema [2009] 1 SCR 295 at [66]-[67]; 2009 
SCC 10 at [66]-[67]. 
192 At least where the act constituting duress also amounts to a tort: Kolmar Group AG v Traxpo Enterprises 
[2010] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 653; [2010] EWHC 113 (Comm). 
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completely as a requirement would be a disproportionate response to the alleged injustice in 
this small minority of cases. 
A number of arguments have been advanced in favour of abandoning the requirement of 
transactional imbalance. However, whilst there is force in some of them, it is submitted that 
they are not compelling for the reasons discussed below. One argument advanced is that a 
purely procedural approach to unconscionability accords better with the fundamental 
principles underlying unjust enrichment 194  or would be consistent with the doctrines 
concerned with procedural unfairness.195 However, if, as discussed above, the function of 
unconscionability is different from that of the doctrines concerned only with procedural 
unfairness, then the need for consistency with these doctrines does not arise. 
Another argument against transactional imbalance is that in a liberal society laws that 
govern private transactions should focus on procedures, not results, and that the only 
transactions that should be set aside are those that infringe the rules concerned to ensure 
procedural fairness.196 However, this idea is not universal.197 And, even if it is accepted as a 
general rule, there can be, and there are, exceptions to it. Some introduced by the 
legislature;198 others developed by the courts.199 Unconscionability is, or may be regarded as, 
one of the latter. 
A third objection against transactional imbalance is that the unfairness of a transaction is 
too difficult for judges to assess and that, under a liberal conception of contract, the terms are 
fair because the parties agreed under conditions of procedural fairness.200 However, the courts 
are well accustomed to assessing unfairness of terms and they have been doing so for 
                                                          
194 McInnes, n 185 above, p 552. 
195 Bigwood, n 185 above, p 213. 
196 McInnes, n 185 above, p 552. 
197 See eg the UNIDROIT Principles, which provide for relief on the ground of gross disparity. See also S Smith, 
‘In defence of Substantive Fairness’ (1996) LQR 138. 
198 Too numerous to list, but see e.g. The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK), discussed above. 
199 Eg the rule against penalties. 
200 Bigwood, n 185 above, pp 208-9. 
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centuries. Indeed the legislature has given the courts powers to assess and remedy substantive 
unfairness in various situations,201 thereby demonstrating the confidence of the legislature in 
the ability of the courts to assess unfairness in the terms of contracts.  
It is also argued that to insist on transactional imbalance as a requirement for relief would 
result in injustice in cases where the court upholds a transaction because the terms are fair, 
even though the defendant took unfair advantage of the claimant’s weakness in the making of 
the decision to enter into the contract.202 But, as discussed above, such cases are very rare. 
Moreover, in such cases the weaker party rarely feels a sufficient sense of injustice to 
challenge the transaction, since “people tend not to contest substantively fair or reasonable 
contracts”.203 If substantive unfairness is what people are really concerned about, then, as a 
matter of legal policy, it is appropriate for judicial intervention on the ground of 
unconscionability to be limited to cases where the transaction is substantively unfair, as being 
more deserving of protection than those where the terms of the transaction are fair. 
A further argument for abandoning transactional imbalance as a requirement was recently 
advanced by the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador in Downer v Pitcher.204 The 
court opined that jettisoning this requirement ‘will bring the [unconscionability] doctrine into 
line with the early English cases which placed emphasis on vulnerability resulting from a 
disparity of bargaining positions and the taking advantage of that vulnerability.’ To support 
this view the court cited a passage in the judgment of Lord Hardwicke in Chesterfield v 
Janssen205 where, according to the court in Downer, he ‘stressed the need to “prevent taking 
surreptitious advantage of the weakness or necessity of another.”’  
                                                          
201 See eg Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK) and ss. 140A and 140B of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 
(UK). 
202 Bigwood, n 185 above, p 207. 
203 Bigwood, n 185 above, pp 207-8. 
204 2017 NLCA 13 at [35]. 
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However, in that passage Lord Hardwicke was merely explaining the purpose of raising a 
presumption of fraud, rather than the purpose of the unconscionability jurisdiction. The 
question in that case was whether if the contract was valid in law, it could be relieved against 
in equity on the ground that it was contrary to conscience. Lord Hardwicke opened his 
discussion of this issue by stating that the court had undoubted jurisdiction in equity to 
relieve against every species of fraud. He then went on to explain various kinds of fraud 
against which equity provided relief. It is his third ‘kind of fraud’ that is referred to by the 
court in Downer. Lord Hardwicke explained that this is fraud ‘which may be presumed from 
the circumstances and condition of the parties contracting’ and that this presumption ‘is 
wisely established in this court to prevent taking surreptitious advantage of the weakness or 
necessity of another’. This passage, in which Lord Hardwicke was explaining the purpose of 
the presumption of fraud, is not an indication that relief on the ground of unconscionability 
was based on procedural unfairness alone. The second kind of fraud identified by Lord 
Hardwicke, but not mentioned by the court in Downer, concerns the case where the bargain 
itself was plainly unfair; ‘such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on 
the one hand, and no honest and fair man would accept on the other.’206 The emphasis here is 
clearly on the unfairness of the terms of the contract itself. Lord Hardwicke expressly stated 
that such transactions ‘are unequitable and unconscientious bargains’.207  
Even before the decision in Chesterfield the position of English law was that for an 
agreement to be set aside on the ground of unconscionability it must be substantively 
unfair.208  In Cory v Cory,209 for example, where a son entered into an agreement with his 
father and afterwards the son complained of paternal authority being exerted (procedural 
                                                          
206 At 155. 
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209 (1747) 1 Ves Sen 19; 27 ER 864 
40 
 
unfairness), the Lord Chancellor stated that ‘though there might be something of that sort, yet 
if the agreement be reasonable, the court will not set it aside.’ And since the agreement in that 
case was reasonable, it was not set aside. Therefore, to abandon substantive unfairness as a 
requirement for relief would be to depart from, rather than to align with, the early English 
cases. 
Another point made by the court in Downer is that statements in some cases in the 
Supreme Court of Canada have emphasised procedural unfairness without reference to 
transactional imbalance.210 However, there are many statements in the Supreme Court of 
Canada identifying transactional imbalance as a criterion for relief. For example, in Norberg 
v Wynrib211 the judgment of La Forest, Gonthier and Cory JJ included ‘proof of substantial 
unfairness of the bargain’212 or ‘terms which are very unfair’213 as one of the requirements for 
relief. The judgment specifically stated that ‘[i]t must be noted that in the law of contract 
proof of an unconscionable transaction involves a two-step process: (1) proof of inequality in 
the positions of the parties, and (2) proof of an improvident bargain.’214 Again in Hodgkinson 
v Simms215 La Forest J stated that whilst undue influence focuses on sufficiency of consent, 
‘unconscionability looks at the reasonableness of a given transaction’. Similarly, in Rick v 
Brandsema216 Abella J, with whom McLachlin CJ and Binnie, Deschamps, Fish, Charron and 
Rothstein JJ agreed, stated that for relief to be available on the ground of unconscionability 
the impugned agreement must be ‘found to be procedurally and substantively flawed’.217 
Moreover, it is significant that there is no statement in the Supreme Court of Canada that 
transactional imbalance is not, or should not be, a requirement for relief. 
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It is perhaps worth noting that transactional imbalance is a requirement for relief in most 
common law jurisdictions. 218  This approach is gaining ground even in some civil law 
jurisdictions. For example, in the recent reform of the law of contract in France, transactional 
imbalance is one of the requirements for relief under the newly introduced unconscionability-
type ground in art 1143 of the Civil Code, discussed above. Moreover, the trend in 
international soft law, including the UNIDROIT Principles,219  is to include transactional 
imbalance as a pre-requisite for relief. English law should not lightly break away from the 
dominant position within common law jurisdictions and the wider international trend. 
If transactional imbalance is to be retained as a requirement, how should English law be 
developed to address the Alec Lobb problem? It is submitted that a sufficient response would 
be to lower the current threshold for establishing transactional imbalance. One way of doing 
this is by replacing the Alec Lobb formulation, that the transaction must be ‘not merely hard 
or improvident, but overreaching and oppressive’, with one that requires a considerable 
imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties under the transaction to the 
disadvantage of the weaker party. This formulation, which is along the lines of the Cresswell 
criterion, strikes a proper balance between the competing interests in this field. On the one 
hand, it increases the likelihood of the claimant obtaining relief since it would make it 
possible for this requirement to be satisfied in those cases, such as Humphreys v 
Humphreys,220 where the transactional imbalance was considerable, but not enough to satisfy 
the Alec Lobb threshold. On the other hand, it would not threaten the general enforceability of 
contracts since the courts will continue to refuse relief in cases where there is no transactional 
imbalance or where it is insignificant.  
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Conclusion 
It is well known that equity mends no man’s bargain.221 However, to protect the weak from 
exploitation by the strong, it intervenes ‘to avoid unconscionable bargains’.222 This paper has 
endeavoured to show that, in the case of English law, the uncertainty and confusion, which 
once bedevilled the criteria for equity’s intervention on this ground, has been replaced by 
certainty and predictability, resulting from the triumph of Alec Lobb over Cresswell. 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the Alec Lobb approach has severely restricted the 
protective reach of unconscionability, thus leaving a deficit in the protection of weaker 
contracting parties. Whilst statutory regulation of unfairness in contracts has now reduced 
this protection deficit, especially in relation to consumers, it has not rendered 
unconscionability otiose, nor has it removed the need to develop unconscionability to enable 
it to meet contemporary challenges in the protection of those contracting under circumstances 
of special disadvantage.  
However, the paper has argued that in developing the English doctrine of 
unconscionability, its concern with unfairness in the terms of the transaction should be 
maintained and that, unlike the approach in a few common law jurisdictions, substantive 
unfairness should not be abolished as a requirement for relief. It has also been argued that, 
contrary to the recent opinion of the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador, the 
concept of constructive notice should not be used to extend the scope of the requirement of 
unconscionable conduct of the stronger party, by facilitating a finding that the stronger party 
had knowledge of the special disability of the weaker party.  
Rather it has been suggested that the Alec Lobb problem should be resolved by modifying 
the current unconscionability criteria. Thus in addition to the requirement that (a) the 
complainant (the weaker party) was under a special disability, what the claimant would need 
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to show, under the proposed test, is that (b) the other party had knowledge of the special 
disability of the weaker party and either took active steps to overreach the weaker party or 
failed to take reasonable steps to satisfy himself that the effects of the special disability had 
been remedied before the transaction was concluded and (c) there was considerable 
transactional imbalance in the resulting transaction to the disadvantage of the weaker party. It 
is hoped that developing the current English law along these lines would extend the 
protective reach of unconscionability and confirm that the doctrine is indeed ‘in good heart 
and capable of adaptation to different transactions entered into in changing circumstances’.223 
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